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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintiffAppellee, 
v . ••• 
BENJAMIN QUINN BARTO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLANT IN CUSTODY 
PRIORITY 2 
Case # 20010948-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Final Judgement and Commitment in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court, Roosevelt, County, for a conviction of Aggravated Assault, a violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, §76-5-103, trial being held before the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne, and sentence 
pronounced on October 31, 2001. 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the conviction pursuant to §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are two issues for review: 
POINT ONE: The trial attorney for Mr. Barto, and the attorney at sentencing were 
ineffective in that they failed to present an adequate defense at trial and failed to provide the trial 
court with alternatives other than incarceration at sentencing. 
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POINT TWO: The trial Court erred in finding Mr. Barto guilty of a Second Degree 
Felony rather than a Third Degree on the basis of intent. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT ONE: TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE. Mr. Barto alleges his trial 
attorney was ineffective for not seeking a jury rather than a bench trial, failing to subpoena 
witnesses, failing to exclude witnesses from the courtroom, failing to raise voluntary intoxication 
as mitigation, and in sentencing, the attorney failed to provide the trial court with alternative for 
structured rehabilitation other prison. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that defense counsel's 
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,5" and that, but for the 
deficient representation, there is a "reasonable probability" that the result would have been 
different. . . . "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 
(1984). 
However, the issue of an alternative to incarceration was not raised at trial and therefore 
not preserved. This Court may only address the issue under the Plain Error standard. "To 
succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.f". quoting 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 120 L 1208 (Utah 1993V 
POINT TWO: The trial Court's failure to find a Third Degree Felony Assault rather than 
that of a Second Degree is a mixed question of law and fact. The facts surrounding the intent 
possessed by Mr. Barto is a question of fact. How such intent it is interpreted in the statute as 
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constituting a Second Degree Felony is a question of law-statutory interpretation. State v. 
Vancleave. P.3d (Utah Ct. App. 2001), "we review the trial court's factual findings for 
clear error, and its legal conclusions for correctness. See State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 753 
(UtahCt.App. 1996)." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this brief and 
pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or attached to this 
brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 4, 2000, Benjamin Quinn Barto was charged in a one count Information by 
Herbert Gillespie, Roosevelt County Attorney, with the charge of Aggravated Assault, a violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-103 (1953), as amended (Record of Trial Court, page 1). The 
charge was filed as either a Second Degree or a Third Degree felony. The charge alleged that on 
January 2, 2000, Mr. Barto did intentionally assault Jason Pickup and caused serious bodily injury 
by using either a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury (R. 1). 
On November 3, 2000, Kenneth G. Anderton, trial attorney for Mr. Barto, filed a request 
to waive the jury trial (R. 58). The bench trial was held on February 7, 2001, in which the judge 
found Benjamin Quinn Barto guilty of a Second Degree Felony (R. 82). On June 13, 2001, Mr. 
Barto's trial attorney withdrew and Thomas V. Rasmussen entered his appearance as defense 
counsel for purposes of the sentence hearing (R. 99-107). 
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On June 25, 2001, the defense objected to the presentence investigation report on the 
basis that the report drafter was a personal friend of the family of the victim, had a conflict of 
interest that was not properly brought to the attention of the court and a new report was ordered 
by the Judge (R. 110, 114). 
On October 31, 2001, the trial Court sentenced Mr. Barto to the Utah State Prison for one 
to fifteen years on the Second Degree Felony (R. 136). Mr. Barto was also ordered to pay 
restitution to the victim and a $2,500 fine (R. 138). On November 15, 2001, Mr. Barto requested 
that an appeal be filed on his behalf and notified the court that he was without an attorney to 
pursue the appeal (R. 141). On November 16, 2001, the trial Court appointed Julie George as a 
public defender for purposes of assisting Mr. Barto in adjudicating his appeal (R. 142). 
Appeal counsel has reviewed the transcripts, the court file, correspondence form Mr. 
Barto and notes taken from interviews with Mr. Barto and files this brief on his behalf 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the bench trial held on February 7, 2001, the defense attorney and the county 
agreed to have all witnesses stay in the court room during the trial and did not invoke the 
exclusionary rule (Trial Transcript, page 7). The county called as its first witness Deputy 
Isaacson of the Uintah County Sheriffs Office, who was employed as a Roosevelt City Police 
Officer at the time of the fight(T. 11-12). Isaacson testified that shortly after 1:00 a.m. on News 
Years Day, 2000 he was called to the ID Lounge in Roosevelt City with several other officers. 
As he approached the bar he way two people come out of the bar putting on their shirts. They 
had blood on their clothing. One of the people was identified as officer Isaacson as Benjamin 
Quinn Barto (T. 12). As the officer called the two men over he identified that the other mas was 
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Jason Stiles (T. 15). Isaacson took pictures of the blood in the bar, the injuries to the victim, Jake 
Pickup, and witness statements about what had occurred (T. 15). Mr. Pickup was sent for 
medical attention (T. 17), and Stiles and Barto were taken to the police station to give witness 
statements (T. 17). 
Mr. Barto gave a witness statement, "We were dancing. Everything was okay till my dad 
went to the bathroom. All I know is after my dad was in the bathroom, we got jumped." (T. 17). 
Isaacson then identified several photographs depicting the injuries to Mr. Pickup, Mr. Barto, Mr. 
Stiles, the blood on the floor, the damage to the bar and medical documents (T. 22, R. 81). The 
officer determined that Mr. Barto had been drinking that night (T. 24) and found broken glass on 
the dance floor (T. 24). 
Jason (Jake) Pickup testified that he was 27 years old and on the night of the fight he and 
his girlfriend, her sister and the sister's boyfriend went to the bar. Pickup was the designated 
driver and so was not drinking-according to his testimony(T. 27). Pickup and his friend played 
pool while their girlfriends went to the dance floor to dance. One of the Barto brothers went to 
the dance floor to try to dance with the girls and the girls left the dance floor. After a few minutes 
all four of Pickup's party went out to dance (T. 28). Pickup had taken Ben Barto Sr.'s pool stick 
by mistake and the Sr. Barto came and asked for it back (T. 28). On the way to the dance floor 
Pickup and Benjamin Quin Barto ran into each other in the doorway and Barto's beer spilled on 
both of them (T. 29). While Pickup and his friends were dancing, Jason Stiles went to the floor 
and began making lewd gestures toward one of the girls (T. 30). Stiles returned to the railing 
where Mr. Barto Sr., Ben Barto Jr. and his brother were standing. They gave Stiles a "high five" 
sign and Stiles returned to the dance floor and began making lewd gestures towards Pickup's 
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girlfriend (T. 31). Pickup moved his girlfriend aside and began pushing Stiles backwards into th 
railing around the dance floor (T. 32). As Pickup stood up from the floor, Barto hit him in the 
face with a beer bottle (T. 32). Pickup was then forced to the floor by Barto, his brother and felt 
glass break underneath him (T. 33). Pickup was being kicked by the defendant, his brother and 
Stiles (T 34-35). Pickup got up, went after Barto and was grabbed by Barto's brother, Sabin 
Barto. He held Pickup while Ben Barto hit pickup (T. 35). Barto Sr. then came up and said lets 
get out of here-lets finish this outside (T. 35). 
Pickup testified that he had a cut above his eyebrow, a cut down his nose that required 10-
12 stitches, his nostril was cut offhis cheek, a chunk cut out of his nose (T. 35-36). 
Pickup admitted on the stand that Barto did not come onto the dance floor and antagonize 
anyone-it was Stiles. Barto only got involved after Pickup pushed Stiles through the dance floor 
railing (T. 37). / 
Candace Musich testified next. She was the bartender in the bar that night. She did not 
see the fight but called the police when someone told her a fight broke out and to call the police 
(T. 40). Musich testified that Barto and Stiles ha been asking what girls they could dance with 
that night but that she did not see Barto try to dance with any girls on the dance floor (T. 43). 
Shontai Domichel then testified that the night of the fight, Stiles came up to her and her 
sister Brandy on the dance floor and tried to touch them while they were dancing. Brandy left the 
dance floor and when Stiles kept after her, Shontai left the floor as well (T. 45). Later Brandy, 
Pickup, Shontai and Clay Hansen went back to the dance floor to dance. Stiles came up and 
began making rude gestures to Shontai and Hansen told him stop. Stiles then made rude gestures 
to Hansen then moved on to Brandy. Stiles refused to back off and Pickup pushed him. Stiles 
6 
came back and the fight between pickup and Stiles started (T. 46-47). Shontai then saw Pickup 
on the floor with three men, including Barto kicking him (T. 48). Glass was on the floor and 
Pickup was bleeding (T. 48). 
Brandy Young testified as Shontai had, both girls had gone tot he dance floor, been 
offended by Stiles and left (T. 49). They returned to dance with their boyfriends and Stiles came 
up making crude gestures towards them (T. 50). Pickup pushed Stiles and they fell through the 
railing (T. 50-51). Brandy saw Barto hit Pickup. Barto had something in his hand and after he hit 
Pickup, glass went everywhere (T. 51). After Barto hit Pickup, Barto, his brother and Stiles 
jumped on Pickup-kicking and punching him (T. 52). 
Almina Simm, also a bartender that night at the ID Lounge testified that she saw the 
incident on the dance floor, she saw Barto hit Pickup either with a beer bottle or a beer glass. She 
saw Barto, his brother and Stiles jump on Pickup and then knock out Clay Hansen (T. 53-56). 
Simm was inconsistent as to who had been on the dance floor making crude gestures and who had 
been antagonizing the girls (T. 56). However, the record is unclear as to which man she is 
indicating when she states, "him" "he" or "they." 
Jennifer Poowegup testified that she was in the bar that night, had two beers to drink and 
was a witness to the fight (T. 57). Ms. Poowegup testified that the two girls were dancing alone 
when Jason went up to try to dance with them. She watched Jake pickup tell Jason to leave them 
alone. She did not see Mr. Barto engage in any activity-he stayed out of trouble-until after Jake 
pushed Jason into the banister (T. 58). Then she saw Mr. Barto hit Jake with a beer bottle. Mr. 
Barto hit Jake while defending Jason (T. 59). It was clear to her that although Quinn hit Jake 
with a beer bottle, it was in defense of Jason Stiles (T. 103-104). 
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Armand D'Agostini, the drummer in the band, witnessed a scene described above-the girls 
dancing alone, Jason trying to dance with them, Jason interrupting the couples dancing-the 
pushing by Jake Pickup, Jason and Jake falling into the bannister (T. 61-62), and them Mr. 
D'Agostini saw Mr. Barto took a beer bottle and leveled Jake Pickup across the face. Glass went 
all over the dance floor and up onto the stage (T. 63). When Mr. Hansen came over to assist Jake 
Pickup, Jason Stiles hit Hansen and knocked him over (T. 63). 
The trial attorney for Mr. Barto cross-examined Mr. D'Agostini and noted that a year 
before, when the incident happened and Mr. D' Agostini filled out a police report, he did not 
mention a beer bottle (T. 64). 
Christy Fritch testified that she was in the bar that night because her boyfriend was playing 
in the band. She was sitting in a booth where the bannister broke. She was watching the band 
play. She watched the activity on the dance floor. She aw Jake Pickup push Jason and Jason pull 
Jake into him and try to hit him when they fell against the bannister (T. 67-68). Ms. Fritch 
jumped out of the way of the bannister and then she saw the blood and glass (T. 69). 
Clay Hansen testified that he was dancing with Shontai, his girlfriend, when Jason came up 
and began acting out. Hansen told him to stop and moved his girlfriend away. Hansen then saw 
Jason doing the same thing to Jake and Brandy. Hansen heard a crash, saw Jason Stiles and Jake 
Pickup going through the bannister (T. 71). Hansen heard a pop, saw Jake Pickup fall onto his 
back and then two other guys start kicking him (T. 72). Hansen went over and tried to help 
Pickup when Jason Stiles hit Hansen. Stiles knocked Hansen down, then Hansen tried to get up 
to help Pickup and Stiles hit him again (T. 72). 
In defense of Mr. Barto, his attorney called Karen Gallis, Mr. Barto's mother who testified 
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that Mr. Barto was a very gentle non-violent person. She stated that he even quit wrestling when 
a competitor was hurt in a match wrestling against him (T. 75). 
Sandy David, testified that she was with the Bartos that night and she remembered things 
differently. The two girls were dancing provactivley in front of the Barto brothers and Jason 
Stiles. At no time did she see Quinn Barto act inappropriately. Ms. David got up, went into the 
bathroom, when she came out the fight was over and the bartenders told them to leave the bar (T. 
77-78). Mr. Barto had a ripped shirt, blood on him, but his hands were not cut (T. 78). 
Sabon Barto, Quinn's brother, was in the Navy and his written statement was read into the 
record. It stated that he, his dad and brother and friends went to the bar that night. They were 
drinking and playing pool. Jason was dancing directly behind a girl and then Jake Pickup pushed 
Stiles through the railing. Sabon went onto the dance floor and was trying to break up the fight 
when someone threw a beer bottle either at Sabon or Jason and then Sabon was getting hit in the 
back fo the head (T. 80-81). Sabon never hit anyone but was trying to break up the fight (T. 81). 
The father of Sabon and Quinn testified that they were in the bar and the girls were 
dancing with Stiles on the dance floor. Mr. Barto Sr. saw Jake Pickup drinking a beer, despite his 
testimony that he had nothing to drink. Mr. Pickup was getting upset about Stiles dancing with 
his girlfriend.(T. 84). Mr. Barto saw Jake Pickup go through the doorway and knock into Quinn 
spilling Quinn's drinks all over the two of them (T. 84-85). Quinn was never drinking beer but 
drinking from a 6oz. Mixed drink glass (T. 85). Mr. Barto Sr. had told Sabon that they should 
get everyone together and leave. He could see that there was going to be trouble between Stiles 
and Pickup because fo what was happening on the dance floor. Mr. Barto Sr. got up and went 
into the bathroom and when he came back Quinn told him that Pickup waited until he went into 
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the bathroom and then jumped them. Quinn was cut and bruised, but did not have one cut on his 
hands (T. 87). 
Dr. Steve Pehrson testified that he treated Jake Pickup in the hospital that night. His 
injuries were consistent with being struck by a beer bottle (T. 101). His cuts were treated by 
stitches and antiseptics. Such a cut "invariably" leaves a scar (T. 102) and could have resulted in 
other serious injury but there was minimal risk of death (T. 102). 
Benjamin Quinn Barto testified that night, he and his father, brother and friends arrived at 
the bar about 11 p.m. They went in to shoot pool. Quinn danced with Jennifer for a while in 
between playing pool. He never danced with Shontai or Brandy or harassed them on the dance 
floor (T. 89-90). Quinn was drinking VO and 7, a mixed drink. He never drank from a beer 
bottle that night (T. 91). He drank some beer but it was poured into the 6 oz. drink glass from 
the bar (T. 91). When Quinn saw Jason get tackled he was 15 feet away from him. Jake tackled 
Stiles like a football tackle and pushed him through the railing (T. 92). Quinn went over to break 
up the fight when he got grabbed on the shoulder, he took a swing at whoever grabbed him and 
the glass went flying out of his hand (T. 92). Quinn testified that he never hit Jake Pickup, that 
Jason Stiles punched him (T. 93). Quinn testified that the fight happened quickly, that it did not 
last long, that in the end people were piled up and hitting each other and that he never intended to 
hurt anyone-just break up the fight between Stiles and Pickup (T. 94). Quinn testified that he 
never intended to hit Pickup-not did he believe that he did-Stiles had hit him. Quinn swung at 
whoever grabbed him, the glass came out of his hand and shattered (T.94). Quinn testified that at 
no time did he have a beer bottle or did he intend to hit anyone with his glass-it was an accident 
(T. 94). Quinn's hands were not cut. He had a three inch cut on his back and a bruise on his 
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forehead but no cuts to his hands (T. 95). 
Quinn had consumed four drinks at the time of the fight, he had a glass of beer in his hand 
when he went to break up the fight between Pickup and Stiles. As Quinn was crossing the floor 
he was grabbed on his right shoulder, he swung with his left hand, the glass flew out of his hand 
and Quinn did not see where it landed (T. 97). Quinn swung around to hit, got caught up in a 
bunch of fists swinging and got hit (T. 98). He never intentionally hit anyone with the glass (T. 
97-98). 
In closing argument the prosecutor acknowledged that the glass in Quinn's hand could 
have been mistaken for a beer bottle (T. 108). The prosecutor argued that as Jake Pickup was 
cut so severely his injuries constituted serious bodily injury and warranted a conviction for a 
Second Degree Felony rather than a Third Degree Felony ( 107-108). 
The defense attorney acknowledged that there was an assault-his defense argument was 
what type of assault, a Second or Third Degree (T. 111). 
After both sides presented closing argument, the trial judge found Benjamin Quinn Barto 
guilty as to both a Third and a Second Degree Felony assault-even though he was only charged in 
the alternative with one count (T. 126). The Court stated, "So I find him guilty on both the 
second and third degree felony as charged. Based upon what I found, I'll sentence him on a 
second degree felony. (T. 126). 
On October 31, 2001, Mr. Barto was sentenced by Judge A. Lynn Payne (Sentence 
Transcript, page 3). At the hearing, defense counsel informed the Court that there were concerns 
over the presentence report. The first report was objected to on the basis that it was written by a 
friend of the victim's family defense counsel believed it was a biased report due to the conflict of 
11 
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interest. However, the new report was essentially the old report with a few minor changes (ST., 
4). The sentence hearing was delayed on two separate occasions so the "new" report could be 
drafted and yet the second report was virtually th same (ST. 1-6). 
The first and second report both stated that Mr. Barto was unwilling to engage in alcohol 
abuse counseling despite Mr. Barto's assertions to both report writers that he would do so (ST. 
6). The second report copied the first in stating Mr. Barto had no remorse, and yet the second 
interviewer also noted Mr. Barto expressed some remorse to him (ST. 7). Mr. Barto's criminal 
history did not indicate that he had a history of violence-only alcohol violations (ST. 7-8). The 
prosecutor argued that as Mr. Barto was on probation in Wyoming, out of state, in a bar drinking 
when the crime occurred-prison was the only choice to be made (ST. 9, 10). 
The victim, Jake Pickup testified that he lost his job due to the injuries he sustained in the 
fight with Mr. Barto (ST. 12). Mr. Pickup detailed his injuries, his permanent scar and how he 
had that Mr. Barto had been bragging about the fight and had not expressed remorse prior to that 
time period (ST. 13) 
The judge debated for some time about whether to put Mr. Barto in prison. He gave him 
a choice at one point to chose jail or prison but sentenced him to prison despite Mr. Barto asking 
for jail time (S.T. 14-18). The deciding factor seemingly being that Mr. Barto was on probation 
in Wyoming, in a bar drinking and used a beer bottle to hit Mr. Pickup. The judge found those 
aggravating factors outweighed the non-violent criminal history, the family support and Mr. 
Barto's age (S.T. 14-18). There was an agreement to the amount of restitution by all parties 
(S.T. 18). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT ONE: TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE. Mr. Barto alleges his trial attorney 
was ineffective for not seeking a jury rather than a bench trial, failing to subpoena witnesses, 
failing to exclude witnesses from the courtroom, failing to raise voluntary intoxication as 
mitigation, and in sentencing, the attorney failed to provide the trial court with alternative for 
structured rehabilitation other prison. 
Mr. Barto asserts that if his trial attorney had been better prepared he would have 
requested a jury trial, thereby giving him an opportunity to have eight individuals rather than just 
one decide if he was guilty. Additionally, he wanted other witnesses subpoenaed at trial to 
support his statements that he held a glass not a bottle and that the breaking of the glass was 
unintentional. He asserts that his trial attorney knew of other band members and patrons of the 
bar that could support his defense but failed to interview them or subpoena them for trial. 
Most importantly, and the point supported by the record is that the trial attorney let all of 
the witnesses stay in the courtroom during testimony. As each one testified they testified in a way 
that supported the earlier witnesses-despite the fact that their police reports given at the time of 
the assault contained a different statement. By allowing the witnesses to remain in the courtroom, 
the trial attorney sabotaged his own client's case. 
Mr. Barto alleges that based on the amount of alcohol he had to drink that night and the 
fact that intent was the whole element at issue in the trial, his attorney should have filed a defense 
motion requesting a one level reduction of the offense based on voluntary intoxication. It was 
clear he had been drinking and the alcohol affected his ability to ascertain whether or not he 
would hurt someone is he swung his hand with a glass in it. Such a motion could have enabled 
13 
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him to be found guilty of a Third Degree Felony offices rather than a Second. 
Last, Mr. Barto alleges that his sentence hearing attorney was ineffective in that he failed 
to provide the Court with any alternatives to prison. Realizing that he was convicted of a Second 
Degree Felony and prison was likely, the attorney failed to come to court with alternatives to 
incarceration. Knowing alcohol played a part in the assault, that Mr. Barto had an alcohol 
problem and that the Presentence report was not favorable-the attorney should have had 
alternatives ready to give the court such as inpatient alcohol treatment. 
POINT TWO: MR. BARTO LACKED THE REQUISITE INTENT TO BE FOUND 
GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE FELONY ASSAULT. The trial Court erred in finding Mr. 
Barto guilty of a Second Degree Felony rather than a Third Degree on the basis of intent. Mr. 
Barto conceded that a beer glass can be defined as a dangerous weapon-if he intended to use the 
weapon to cause serious bodily injury. He asserts that he did not. He may have held the glass but 
never intended to use the glass to cause serious bodily injury to Mr. Pickup. Mr. Barto asserts 
that the trial Court erred when it mixed prong (a) and (b) together of the assault statute. He 
asserts that at most he is guilty of Third Degree Felony assault. In fact, the trial Court found as 
much in his findings and then at sentencing ordered that he be sentenced as a Second Degree 
Felony rather than a Third Degree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN TRIAL AND SENTENCE. 
Trial Counsel waived the jury and held a bench trial. Mr. Barto asserts that had the 
ramifications been fully explained to him he never would have agreed to waiving his jury trial 
rights. Furthermore, trial counsel allowed all the witnesses to remain in the courtroom during all 
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of the testimony (T. 9-11). When each witness testified they essentially testified to the same facts, 
1) Mr. Barto had a bottle of beer in his hand, 2) Mr. Barto hit Jake Pickup in the face with the 
bottle, 3)Mr. Barto continued to kick and hit Mr. Pickup after he hit him with the bottle. This 
was the testimony although it was clear that Mr. D'Agostini had never put that in his initial police 
statement. Ms. Poowegup in trial, rather than in her initial statement was sure that Mr. Barto had 
a beer bottle. 
There was clear testimony that Mr. Barto was never in possession of a beer bottle, only a 
6oz. Glass with beer in it. There was testimony that Mr. Barto was not an aggressor, only 
involved in an effort to break up the fight between Stiles and Pickup. However, by allowing all of 
the prosecutions witnesses to remain in the courtroom, hear all of the other witnesses and the 
police officer testify, their testimony parroted each other. Mr. Barto asserts that the prosecution's 
case was much stronger than originally determined by allowing the state witnesses to sit in the 
court room and make sure their story conformed with each other. For example, Mr. D'Agonstini 
provided testimony in trial, after he heard the other witnesses refer to it, that was never in his 
original police report (T. 64). He never stated the night of the fight that he saw Mr. Barto with a 
beer bottle or hit Mr. Pickup with the glass. In trial, after hearing all the witnesses testify about 
the glass, Mr. D' Agonstini then testified that he to saw Mr. Barto hold a beer bottle and hit Jake 
Pickup with the bottle. Such testimony was a complete change from the original police report and 
clearly was a result of having sat in the courtroom and listen to the other witnesses testify. 
To allow the witnesses to stay in the court was conduct that fell below the objective 
standard of reasonableness. The case was one that depended almost in its entirety of witness 
testimony. To allow eyewitness to sit in court and hear other eyewitnesses testify is deficient 
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representation. Once it is established that the conduct of defense counsel's representation "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" Mr. Barto must also then show that, but for the 
deficient representation, there is a "reasonable probability" that the result would have been 
different. . . . "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 
(1984). 
Here, in support of the allegation that the result would have been different, Mr. Barto 
asserts that the prosecution's case would have been less strong, the witnesses would not have 
been able to conform their testimony to each other, and consequently more weight would have 
been given to the defense witnesses if the trial attorney had invoked the exclusionary rule. 
By allowing all the state witnesses to conform their versions of events, it made Mr. 
Barto's testimony look dishonest. When Mr. Barto testified he never had a beer glass only a bar 
glass-it looked like he was not believable in light of the many state witnesses testifying to the fact 
that he had a beer bottle. In fact, the witnesses originally provided that they saw glass break-not 
that it was a beer bottle. In trial their testimony became stronger, more specific and consequently 
more damaging to Mr. Barto. Had the witnesses been excluded the out come of the trial would 
have been different. There would be less doubt shed upon Mr. Barto and his witnesses about the 
beer glass, and the main issue of intent would have been presented in a light more favorable to the 
defense. 
Additionally, Mr. Barto alleges that Mr. Anderton failed to subpoena other witnesses that 
were favorable to him. He alleges that there other band members and witnesses in the bar that 
could have supported his theory of defense that although he swung his fist that night, it was not at 
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Mr. Pickup-the glass came out of his hand as he swung and hit Mr. Pickup by mistake. In State 
v. Marquez, P.3d (Utah Ct. App 2002), this Court reiterated that in support of claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel H[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1993)." Here, unless Mr. Barto can establish that a jury rather than a bench trial would 
have resulted in a more favorable outcome such a claim cannot survive the test of mere 
speculation. Moreover, to allege that there were other witnesses that could have supported the 
defense theory which were not called to testify is- without evidence in the appellate record-mere 
speculation. 
Mr. Barto asserts that the issues as a whole show that his trial attorney was ineffective in 
his representation at trial. A bench trial, a trial with no unrelated witnesses to testify regarding the 
defense theory and allowing the state's witnesses to remain in the courtroom and hear all the 
other testimony establishes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Barto alleges that his trial attorney failed to raise the defense of voluntary 
intoxication. Voluntary intoxication reduces the degree of the offense by one degree. It was 
provided in trial that Mr. Barto had at least four mixed drinks and then some beer. If the trial 
attorney had pursued that line of questioning and properly filed a timely motion for the defense of 
voluntary intoxication he could have argued to the Court that the intoxication lessened the intent 
required for the Second Degree Felony and asked that the trial Court impose a conviction and 
sentence for a Third Degree Felony on the basis of voluntary intoxication. 
The Utah Code 76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication statute provides, 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
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negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense; however, if 
recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware 
of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for 
that offense. 
Based on the number of drinks Mr. Barto had in the time that he was at the bar, in 
conjunction with anything he may have had to drink earlier in the night, he qualified for a 
voluntary intoxication defense in that his intoxicated state prevented him from forming the mens 
rea necessary to intentionally use the beer glass to assault Mr. Pickup and intentionally cause 
serious bodily injury. 
The trial attorney never raised the issue prior to trial, during trial, nor was it raised as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing. 
When a claim is not preserved at the trial court level this Court can only review the matter 
if mistake is one of plain error-meaning it is so obvious that the Court should have discovered the 
problem and moved to address the issue sua sponte. Most recently in State v. Chatelain P.3d 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001), the rule was reiterated, "To succeed on a claim of plain error, a 
defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful."1. quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993), See also State v. HelmicL 9 P.3d 164 (Utah 2000). 
Mr. Barto alleges that his trial and sentence attorney was ineffective for failing to file the 
voluntary intoxication motion. Had the motion been filed the outcome of the final conviction-a 
Third rather than a Second Degree Felony-would have been more likely. It was obvious that the 
Court was struggling with whether or not to send Mr. Barto to prison. The Court offered jail 
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time in lieu of prison at one point in the sentence hearing. With the court struggling with the 
severe penalty its shows that another possible outcome could have been likely. Additionally, the 
Court struggled in finding the intentional mens rea required for the Second Degree Felony (T. 
117-126). Had the defense attorney filed the voluntary intoxication motion it would have given 
the Court the element the Court was looking for to impose the Third Degree Felony. Knowing 
that the case would boil down to which degree of crime had been committed, not whether a crime 
had been committed at all, made it such that defense counsel should have done all he could to 
insure that the lower penalty was established. By filing the voluntary intoxication motion the trial 
attorney could have easily changed the degree of crime imposed. The motion, in and of itself 
could have undermined the confidence in the out come of the case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2068 (1984). 
Mr. Barto alleges that his attorney was ineffective at sentencing in that the attorney could 
clearly see the Court was struggling with sending Mr. Bart to prison and the attorney failed to 
provide the Court with a reasonable alternative to incarceration. It was clear that Mr. Barto had a 
problem with alcohol and yet the attorney did not provide the Court with the option of placing 
Mr. Barto in an in-patient treatment facility for alcoholics, intensive out-patient treatment for 
alcoholics, request an ankle monitor, home confinement or a combination of the above in lieu of 
incarceration. 
This Court has stated in State v. Legg. P.3d (Utah Cr. App. 2001), " HA 
sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." 
State v. NuttalL 861 P.2d 454,457 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)". However, in this case, where the 
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Court was clearly struggling with what to do with Mr. Barto, trial counsel was ineffective for not 
suggesting alternatives to incarceration for the Court to consider as a "legally relevant factor." 
As set forth above, by giving the Court an alternative to prison but insuring that Mr. Barto 
would be punished for his behavior the trial attorney could have prevented the prison sentence. 
Knowing that MR. Barto had a alcohol problem the attorney should have filed a motion to have 
Mr. Barto committed to an in-patient alcohol treatment facility in lieu of incarceration. Again, by 
filing such a motion the outcome of the sentence would have been different. It was obvious the 
Court was struggling with a commitment to prison-such a motion easily could have tipped the 
scales. 
POINT TWO: THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THE INTENT 
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
In trial the judge found Mr. Barto guilty of both a Third and a Second Degree 
Felony. However, he determined that he was going to sentence Mr. Barto on a Second Degree 
Felony. Mr. Barto alleges it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to find him guilty of both 
counts and then to sentence him to the higher degree of crime. Mr. Barto asserts that the trial 
Court erred when it mixed prong (a) and (b) together of the assault statute. He asserts that at 
most he is guilty of Third Degree Felony assault. In fact, the trial Court found as much in his 
findings and then at sentencing ordered that he be sentenced as a Second Degree Felony rather 
than a Third Degree (T. 126). 
"An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 
'inherently unfair* or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive1 sentence." State v. Russell 791 
P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted). "The exercise of discretion in sentencing 
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necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find 
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, "this discretion is not to 
be surrendered to a mathematical formula by which numbers of circumstances rather than weight 
of circumstances are determinative. The overriding consideration is that the sentence be just. One 
factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale." 
Russell 791 P.2d at 192.", Legg, above. 
Additionally, Mr. Barto alleges that the trial Court erred when it found him guilty of 
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to Mr. Pickup. Mr. Barto asserts that there was an 
assault-he was swinging-he did not recall having made contact with Mr. Pickup but could have 
done so. Mr. Barto does not deny that an assault occurred, he denies that he intentionally hit Mr. 
Pickup with the glass. Mr. Barto took a swing, forgetting that he had the glass in his hands, and 
when he swung his hand the glass was propelled out of his hand and hit Mr. Pickup. The glass 
shattering into Mr. Pickup was an accident and not an intentional act. If Mr. Barto did not intend 
to hit Mr. Pickup with the glass, if the act was one of reckless behavior then there is insufficient 
intent to support the Second Degree Felony conviction. 
The Utah Code provides: 76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 
and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
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bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Mr. Barto asserts that the assault occurred, that under Utah case law the beer glass could 
be defined as a dangerous weapon and therefore he is guilty of Aggravated Assault. The issue is 
whether he intended to use the glass as a weapon or if in the heat of the moment he forgot he had 
the glass in his hand and recklessly threw it when he swung his hand. 
The testimony of the witnesses is that Mr. Barto never antagonized anyone that night, he 
did not dance with the girls, taunt Mr. Pickup or Hansen, nor did he throw the first punch. Ms. 
Poowegup testified-and it was supported by the other witnesses-that Mr. Barto only got involved 
when his friend was tackled and pushed into the railing. At that point Mr. Barto jumped in to 
stop the fight. He thought he was being grabbed, the fight happened very fast and he swung. Mr. 
Barto forgot the beer glass, swung his hand and either hit Mr. Pickup with the glass, or let go of 
the glass and it hit Mr. Pickup. Mr. Barto had not cuts on his hands nor any other injures to show 
he was an aggressor. He had a bruise on his forehead where he was hit, a cut on back where he 
was pushed to the ground and the glass cut his back, and no cuts on his hands. If he had 
intentionally hit Mr. Pickup with the glass it would have shattered on Mr. Barto's hands and he 
would be cut. However, no cuts were on his hands or arms. 
If Mr. Barto did not intend to use the glass as a dangerous weapon and intend to cause the 
harm suffered by Mr. Pickup, then he is guilty of Third Degree Assault, not Second Degree 
assault. Mr. Barto recklessly held the glass while jumping into the fight to stop the assault on mr. 
Stiles. Mr. Barto intended to swing his arm, intended to assault someone who he had believed 
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had grabbed him from behind, however, he never intended to use the beer glass as a weapon to 
cause more injury. Reckless use of the beer glass is insufficient to support the intentionally 
element necessary to support the Second Degree conviction. In State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1993), the Haston, court held " that attempted depraved indifference homicide was not a 
crime because the mens rea of recklessness would not support a criminal charge under the attempt 
statute." 
Here, Mr. Barto asserts that although he intentionally meant to hit someone, he never 
intended to use the glass as a dangerous weapon such that it would inflict serious bodily injury. If 
he used, recklessly or unintentionally a dangerous weapon, his assault is one define under section 
1(b), not 1(a) of the statute and he committed a Third Degree Felony assault. 
Although Haston, was dealing with homicide rather than assault, the rule is still 
applicable. In Haston, the evidence before the jury would have supported a conclusion that, while 
the defendant did not intend or know his actions would cause death, firing a gun during a drunken 
quarrel was a reckless act. Thus, it was possible Haston was convicted of a nonexistent crime. 
Here, Mr. Barto alleges that no facts exist to support the theory that intentionally hit Mr. 
Pickup, intending that the beer glass in his hand could be used as a dangerous weapon and 
therefore case serious bodily injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Barto respectfully requests this Court to vacate his conviction and remand the case for 
a new trial. In the alternative he asks this Court to vacate his sentence and impose a sentence 
consistent with a Third Degree Felony and direct the Parole Board to review his incarceration. 
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